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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BECO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., an Idaho corporation,
PlaintiffIAppellant,

v.
J-U-B ENGINEERS, INC., an Idaho corporation,
DefendantIRespondent.
Supreme Court No. 35873-2008
APPELLANT'S REPLY BFUEF

--*^

--"^--

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Bannock County.
Honorable Peter D. McDermott, District Judge, presiding.
Bryan D. Smith, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Appellant.
C. Tom Arlcoosh, Esq., residing at Gooding, Idaho, for Respondent,
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ARGUMENT

I.
J-U-B'S RESPONDING BRIEF NEVER ADDRESSES THE CENTRAL ISSUE THAT
THE COURT AWARDED MORE IN ATTORNEY'S FEES THAN IS EVEN
MATHEMATICALLY POSSIBLE.
J-U-B does not dispute that as of August 15,2005, J-U-B incurred $33,661.92 in
attorney's fees. This is simply a matter of mathematical calculation. This Court has held
that J-U-B can recover attorney's fees only for defending BECO's contract claim that
BECO withdrew on August 15,2005. Thus, the district court cannot award more than
$33,661.92 in attorney's fees because $33,661.92 is the total amount of attorney's fees
incurred through August 15,2005. Nowhere in its responding brief on appeal does J-U-B
address how the district court did not abuse its discretion awarding $35,600 in attorney's
fees when the district court could award no more than $33,661.92 because even J-U-B
cannot fashion a reasonable argument that supports the district court's exercise of
discretion.
Moreover, common sense dictates that the actual amount of attorney's fees
attributable to defending only against the contract claim must be less than $33,661.92, not
$1,938.98 greater than $33,661.92. BECO alleged claims against J-U-B for breach of
contract, negligence, and intentional interference with contract. J-U-B's answer and
motion for suminary judgment filed before August 15,2005 addressed all three claims,
not just the contract claim. Thus, not all the $33,661.92 can be aitributed solely to the
contract claim. In other words, the attorney's fees attributable only to the contract claim
must necessarily be less than $33,661.92. J-U-B also fails to address this issue in its
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responding brief on appeal similarly because even J-U-B cannot fashion a reasonable
argument that supports the district court's exercise of discretion.
11.
J-LI-B REI.IES ON I . \ I l ' E R % I I S S ~ ~ ~ < V I D 1 ; _ NTO
C I ISUPPORI
'1'1-1E I > I S m T C0L'R'I"S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION.
J-U-B argues that the court reconsidered the testimony of J-U-B's expert witness,
Mr. John Bailey, an attorney from Pocatello, Idaho. J-U-B argues that the court relied on

Mr. Bailey's testimony to establish (1) the reasonableness of the work done; (2) the
reasonableness of the rate charged; (3) his opinion that BECO's complaint was not well
researched; and (4) his opinion that litigation against BECO is difficult and unreasonably
time consuming. However, the law is well established that expert testimony is not
admissible unless it assists the finder of fact. I.R.E. 702. If testimony is within the
common experience of the finder of fact, then expert testimony is not admissible. State v.

Vauie, 135 Idaho 848 (2001.)
Here, the finder of fact on the attorney's fees issue is the court. J-U-B cannot
argue that Mr. Bailey's testimony on the reasonableness of the work done, the
reasonableness of the rate charged, and the sufficiency of the research for the complaint
were matters to assist the trial court or beyond the common experience of the trial court.
The trial court is the expert that decides these kinds of issues all the time as a matter of
law. Moreover, testimony that litigation with any particular party is "difficult and
unreasonably time consuming" is also not the proper subject of expert testimony because
it does not involve technical, scientific, or specialized knowledge that will assist the trier
of fact. Thus, the district court relied on "evidence" that was not appropriate for
determining the amount of attorney's fees to award against BECO.
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J-U-B'S "RIGHT RESULTJWRONG REASON
ARGUMENT IS MISPLACED.
J-U-B argues that this Court could uphold the district court's award of attorney's
fees by applying the "right resulthong reason" test. In other words, J-U-B argues that
the district court could have reached the $35,600 attorney's fees award "if the district
court had held that BECO's unjustifiable claims were made and pursued frivolousiy."'
However, this argument flies in the face of the fact that the district court specifically held
JUB was not entitled to attorney's fees under I.C. $12-121 since BECO's claims were not
pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.' Because J-U-B has never
cross-appealed this finding, J-U-B cannot now challenge it or argue "what might have
been" as an alternate basis for upholding the district court's $35,600 attorney fee award.
IV .
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PAYING
J-U-B BECO'S CASH DEPOSIT ON APPEAL.
J-U-B and the district court rely on I.R.C.P. 79(e) entitled "reclaiming exhibits,

documents or property" after trial as the law that authorized the district court to take
BECO's $41,140 cash bond on appeal and pay it over to J-U-B pending appeal.
However, a basic tenant of statutory construction is that a more specific statute
addressing the issue controls over the statute that is more general. Mulder v. Liberty

Northwesf Ins. Co., 135 Idaho 52 (2000.) Here, I.A.R. 13(b)(15) specifically addresses
the district court's duty with respect to a cash deposit after the appellate court has vacated
any money judgment and remanded only for a determination of the amount of the

' See Respondent's Brief, p. 1 1 ,
RVo1. IV, p. 813.
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judgment. Thus, I.A.R. 13(b)(15) is specific to cash bonds and controls over a general
rule regarding "reclaiming exhibits, documents or property." Under this rule, the district
court was supposed to modify the cash deposit by lowering it to 136% of the $41,140
judgment amount for attorney's fees rather than paying J-U-B $41,140 from the cash
deposit. Accordingly, this Court should order on remand that J-U-B immediately pay
$41,140 to the Clerk of the Court pending further proceedings on remand.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above and in BECO's Opening Brief, this Court
BECO's Opening Brief.

should grant BECO the relief set forth in the
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

2009.

Attorneys ~ ~ ~ " B EConstruction
CO
Company, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of November, 2009,I caused a true

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be served, by
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the
following:

&

[
MAIL
[ 1 FAX
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery
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C. Tom Arkoosh, Esq.
Daniel A. Nevala
CAPITOL LAW GROUP, PLLC
301 Main Street
P. 0. Box 32
Gooding, Idaho 83330-0032
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